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Abstract
The formation of an alliance in con￿ ict situations is known to suf-
fer from a collective action problem and from the potential of internal
con￿ ict. We show that budget constraints of an intermediate size can
overcome this strong disadvantage and explain the formation of al-
liances.
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1 Introduction
The formation of an alliance constitutes a puzzle. Alliances are very common
in many applications that constitute contests or tournaments, including mil-
itary con￿ ict, R&D tournaments, lobbying and political campaigning. But,
as shown by Esteban and SÆkovics (2003), alliance formation involves severe
strategic disadvantages that make them undesirable under a wide range of
circumstances if the members of the alliance can join and coordinate their ef-
forts when ￿ghting against an external enemy, but behave non-cooperatively
vis-a-vis each other.1 First, the alliance as a group faces a collective action
problem. Second, once an alliance wins the con￿ ict against a joint enemy,
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1peace inside the alliance may end and the members of the alliance may
turn against each other.2 The anticipated cost of this internal con￿ ict also
makes alliance formation less attractive. We show that capacity constraints
on e⁄ort can make such a non-cooperative alliance between equal alliance
members pro￿table for its members, compared to the grand contest in which
all players compete simultaneously in one single stage.
2 The alliance formation puzzle
Consider a set of three players N = fA;B;Cg who contest for a prize that
is valued equally by all three players, and normalize this value to 1. The
players B and C may form an alliance against player A.3 Once the alliance
has formed, two groups fAg and fB;Cg contest with each other in an all-
pay auction without noise as characterized by Hillman and Riley (1989) and
Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996). Let the e⁄ort choices of A; B and
C in this inter-group contest (stage 1) be xA 2 [0;mA]; xB 2 [0;mB] and
xC 2 [0;mC], where mA, mB and mC describe the maximum e⁄ort that
can be mobilized at this stage, due to some capacity constraints. Assume
further that the e⁄orts of alliance members add up to the e⁄ort xB+xC of the
alliance. The probability that A wins is pfAg = 1 if xA > xB +xC, pfAg = 0
if xA < xB + xC, and pfAg = 1=2 if xA = xB + xC, and pfB;Cg = 1 ￿ pfAg.
The game ends if player A wins this contest and receives the prize. If
the alliance fB;Cg wins, the two alliance members need to determine how
2Katz and Tokatlidu (1996) and W￿rneryd (1998) address the problem of internal
con￿ ict that may emerge inside an alliance that is victorious in the contest with another
group, and analyse this nested structure in the context of a Tullock contest. To illustrate
the structure with an example, consider the alliance between the USA and Russia during
World War II. The alliance was seemingly useful for the Allied Forces in their goal of
defeating Nazi Germany and its coalition. However, when the end of the war came closer,
a divergence of interests among the Allied Forces became visible. It was not di¢ cult
to anticipate that the alliance would break up after the defeat of Germany and that a
con￿ ict between the two large victorious countries would emerge. Rational players may
therefore have anticipated what is now known as the Cold War. From this perspective,
the conferences that took place prior to the termination of the war (e.g., the Moskow
Conference, October 1944, and the Yalta Conference, February 1945) can be seen as
attempts to reach an agreement regarding the division of the gains of winning the war.
Part of the agreement, for instance, was the division of the defeated region into spheres
of in￿ uence. As is well-known now, these attempts have not been very successful. The
agreements were not time consistent. They did not solve the fundamental con￿ ict and
competition about the future social and economic world order and political dominance.
3Alliance formation is typically a voluntary process. Describing this endogeneity is a
di⁄erent and di¢ cult problem.
2the prize is shared between them. Due to the lack of enforceable contracts
between B and C the two allies will themselves enter into a distributional
con￿ ict (stage 2). They simultaneously choose con￿ ict e⁄ort yB 2 [0;mB]
and yC 2 [0;mC], or random distributions described by cumulative distri-
bution functions GB and GC on these intervals, and win probabilities are
pB = 1 if yB > yC, pB = 0 if yB < yC, and pB = 1=2 if yB = yC. Each
player￿ s payo⁄ is equal to his probability of winning the prize, minus the
player￿ s own cost of contest e⁄ort(s), i.e.,
￿A = pfAg ￿ xA
￿B = (1 ￿ pfAg)pB ￿ xB ￿ yB
￿C = (1 ￿ pfAg)pC ￿ xC ￿ yC.
(1)
We examine an extended game in which e⁄ort choices in stage 1 also occur
simultaneously. fAg chooses xA or a mixed strategy described by a cumula-
tive distribution function FfAg. The members of the alliance may correlate




z for z 2 [0;mA)
1 for z ￿ mA
(2)
They choose their e⁄orts xB and xC independently from each other and may
make their choices dependent on z. Instead of pure strategies xi(z) 2 [0;mi]
players i 2 fB;Cg may also choose cumulative distribution functions Fi as
functions of z. When choosing their e⁄orts, B and C individually maximize
their individual payo⁄s, respectively.




2 ). Then a subgame perfect equilibrium of the extended game
exists with ￿A = 0, ￿B + ￿C = 1 ￿ mA ￿ 2m.
Proof. Consider stage 2. If fAg was the winner of the inter-group contest,
A receives the full prize, without further ￿ghting. If fB;Cg wins the prize in
stage 1, B and C ￿ght over the distribution of the prize in an all-pay auction.
Their e⁄ort choices are yB and yC, with yi 2 [0;m] for i 2 fB;Cg. The
solution of this contest depends on the size of m. Since m ￿ 1
2 ￿ mA
2 < 1=2;
both B and C expend the maximum e⁄ort in the unique equilibrium of this
4See Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) who introduce the concept of an extended game
with public randomization to restore existence of equilibrium in continuous games with
almost perfect information. In our game only the members of the alliance observe the
realization of z.
3subgame, each wins with a probability of 1=2, and each has a payo⁄ from
participating in this subgame of v ￿ 1
2 ￿ m > 0.
Turning to stage 1, consider the following e⁄ort choices as a candidate
equilibrium: Let xB(z) = xC(z) = z





v for xA 2 [0;mA]
1 for xA > mA.
(3)
We show that, given the equilibrium play in the subgame in stage 2, these
e⁄ort choices constitute optimal replies vis-a-vis each other.
Consider ￿rst A. This player anticipates that the joint e⁄ort x = xB+xC
of B and C is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function
FfB;Cg(x) =
￿
x for x 2 (0;mA)
1 for x ￿ mA.
(4)
Hence, his payo⁄ from choosing xA is xA ￿ 1 ￿ xA = 0 for xA 2 [0;mA), and
mA
1 ￿ 1
2 ￿ mA ￿ 0 for xA = mA. This makes A indi⁄erent as regards the
choice of xA 2 [0;mA), and makes FA(xA) in (3) an optimal reply.
Consider now B. This player attributes the value v = 1
2 ￿m to a victory
of the alliance in stage 1. Observing z and taking the probability FA(x) that









v )v ￿ xB for xB 2 [0;mA ￿ z
2]






v )v￿xB = v￿mA+ z
2, any xB 2 [0;mA￿ z
2] is maximizing
this ￿B(xB); this makes xB(z) = z=2 an optimal reply. The proof for why
xC(z) = z=2 is an optimal reply for C is fully analogous. Moreover, if
xB(z) = xC(z) = z=2, this together with FZ generates (4).
The contest problem combines the all-pay auction problem with di⁄erent
budget limits as in Che and Gale (1997) with a collective action problem in
stage 1 and a potential all-pay auction in stage 2.5 In the equilibrium the
members of the alliance are able to overcome the collective action problem
in stage 1, using perfectly correlated strategies. The solution requires a
randomization device that is observable for B and C, but not for A. For
simplicity, we assumed that this device is exogenously given to the alliance.
5A similar equilibrium with correlated e⁄orts, but without budget constraits is analysed
in Konrad and Leininger (2007). However, they use multiplicity of subgames in later stages
and the threat of deviating to an inferior equilibrium to enforce high collective e⁄orts. In
our context, the equilibrium e⁄orts are self-enforced without such threats.
4Our result constrasts with the ￿ndings in Esteban and SÆkovics (2003).
They consider a structurally very similar nested con￿ ict, with a Tullock
contest success function, instead of perfect discrimination without noise.
Also, they allow for convex costs of e⁄ort for each player, and their players
are not capacity constrained. They ￿nd that the payo⁄s of the members
of the alliance are lower and the payo⁄ of the single player is higher than
if all three players compete in a single-stage Tullock contest. We ￿nd the
opposite. If A;B and C contest in a single-stage all-pay auction without
noise and have capacity constraints mA > mB = mC ￿ m; an equilibrium
has ￿A = mA￿m > 0, and ￿B = ￿C = 0. This shows that alliance formation
can bene￿t the players who form the alliance and harm the player who is
not a member of the alliance.
The speci￿c choice of budget limits in this example is not arbitrary. First,
consider the role of m 2 (mA
2 ; 1
2 ￿ mA
2 ) for this result. If m < mA
2 , then, by
a choice of xA = 2m + ￿, player A can guarantee himself a payo⁄ that is
arbitrarily close to 1￿2m, and of 1￿m in a game without alliance formation.
Second, A is given a larger budget than B and C, so that alliance formation
allows for higher joint e⁄orts by B and C than A￿ s maximum e⁄ort. To
overbid A￿ s maximum e⁄ort was infeasible if players B and C stayed alone.
Given mA > mB = mC = m, the equilibrium outcome of a three-player
"playing the ￿eld" all-pay auction without noise led to equilibrium payo⁄s
￿A = 1 ￿ m, and ￿B = ￿C = 0.
Third, mB = mC has been chosen in order to avoid giving B or C a strict
advantage in the intra-group con￿ ict in stage 2. If mB > mC, then B and
C face a more di¢ cult collective action problem, as B can outbid C in the
intra-alliance contest in stage 2. In turn, this causes vB = 1￿mC and vC = 0
and this would prevent C from contributing in the inter-group contest. This
problem regarding mB 6= mC should not be taken too literally. First, if one
assumes a contest success function with noise in stage 2, a small di⁄erence
in budgets does not change the results qualitatively. Second, if B￿ s and C￿ s
budgets are not certain, but uncertain and drawn from a distribution at the
beginning of stage 2, then the strong hold-up that is generated by mB 6= mC
also disappears. Third, and more strictly within our framework with given
and known mB and mC and an all-pay auction without noise in stage 2,
if B and C correctly anticipate the incentive problems this implies, they
might be able to make a transfer of capacity between them in stage 1 and
have an option to in￿ uence the e⁄ort limits they have available in both the
inter-group con￿ ict and in the intra-alliance con￿ ict, so that B and C can
escape from the hold-up from mB 6= mC in this way, again making the the
outcome underlying Proposition 1 an equilibrium.
53 Conclusions
If players would like to expend more than their budget in an all-pay auction,
the player who has a higher budget than his competitor can make a bid that
is slightly higher than his competitor￿ s budget, and guarantee a victory.
An alliance may increase the range of possible e⁄ort, compared to players￿
options in a stand alone situation. The formation of an alliance may allow
the group to outbid budget constrained competitors. This is an advantage
from joining forces. On the other hand, in the literature alliances have
been seen as being very detrimental to its members because of the later
con￿ ict between these members. With su¢ ciently low budget or capacity
constraints, however, the strategic disadvantage is more than outweighed
by the increase in competitive strength of the alliance. Capacity constraints
also allow the alliance to overcome the collective action problem. Hence, the
bene￿cial budget enlargement e⁄ect of forming an alliance may outweigh the
potentially harmful strategic e⁄ects. For this to happen, the alliance needs
to be su¢ ciently strong, but not too strong.
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